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Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)
The Transformation of Mathematics in the Renaissance and the Return to 
Euclid.
The Euclidean Enterprise
Galileo and the Birth of Modem Science
Galileo and the Mathematization of Nature
Husserl and The Crisis in the History of Modem Science
Introduction
This essay surveys a number of intellectual currents in and about the Weimar Republic (1919- 
33), and attempts to provide a limited background for understanding the codetcrminacy of 
scientific, cultural, and socio-political crisis. It will not argue from the standpoint of any kind 
of historical determinism in which one range of events or ideas would be the first and final 
cause of another. Such a project has neither theoretical viability nor empirical credibility It 
will rather attempt to map out the contours of a constellation of cultural elements around the 
concept of crisis in order to penetrate the semiotic function of both the concept and the period 
in which it is so passionately meaningful. This involves both a thematization of the concept of 
crisis with respect to a number of cultural artifacts and the analysis of a number of assertions 
about the nature of an alleged crisis. In what follows I cannot hope to provide any kind of 
empirical demonstration of continuity between historical or cultural crisis and the crisis of 
rationality that is the primary object of this essay. However I will try, as far as possible, to 




























































































(gr. kreiuott), which means at once division and decision, judgment, choice, measure, strife, 
battle.1
From this point of departure it is useful to begin with the term “crisis” in its 
originally operative juridical sense, associated with legality, legitimacy, governing and 
citizenship in the Hellenistic period. The term's contemporary application grew out of this 
analytic notion, through a mutation introduced by the temporization implicit in Christian 
theology and the Christian eschatological world-view, and assuring a situation of reality and 
value that is not yet in place, but rather potential, Christian theology turns attention towards 
non-presence, towards what is not but shall be. Thereby the notion of historical crisis 
becomes the dominant mode of the concept. The “decision” or “judgment” in its juridical 
sense becomes involved in an attitude about the present based on something non-present, be it 
the unrealized but realizable future, or, inversely, the unworthiness of the present with respect 
to a non-present, and non-recoverable past. This teleological theme is fully developed in the 
Idealist and Romantic historical theories of 18th and 19th centuries, and in modem ideologies 
of progress in general. As we will see, these traditions will be central in the make-up of the 
Weimar Republic. The conception of crisis as moment of historical decision, as a turning 
point in time, also opens the 20th century obsession with decline, eclipse and apocalypse. 
Crisis is henceforth understood as both a moment in a general movement of “progress”, a 
surpassing of some prior state of society, culture, politics, material being, or even knowledge 
in a gesture of continuity, and as a radical break, expulsion or purification of the priori state. 
Crisis is thus the name of a productive paradox: it is both continuity and rupture. It is the 
generative dialectic of that paradox. In other words, it is a constant demonstration of the 
continuity in any rupture, and the implicit rupture that is necessary to understand historical 
continuity at all.
Our axes of research will be four crises surrounding the rise and fall of the 
Weimar Republic, one of the most tormented and paradoxical peacetime periods in modem 
European history. The first tension revolves around the very existence of the Republic, its 
status as a bearer of culture and meaning for the German people, and its viability as the 
fundamental bulwark for the organization of a traditionally class-based culture. The second 
crisis is the revolution which rattles the very foundations of the natural sciences in general,
1 Reinhart Koselleck. "Krise”, Historisches Wjrlerbuch der Philosophic, pp. 1236-40. Reinhart 
Koselleck, “Krise", Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zurpolitisch-sozialen Sprache in 





























































































and physics and mathematics in general. These two fields, traditionally understood as the 
guarantors of the validity of Everyman’s understanding of reality find themselves profoundly 
shaken in the last years of the century. These traditional affirmations of the legitimacy of 
common sense perceptions suffer uncanny theoretical blows around the turn of the century, 
and veer radically from their well-established paths. The third crisis closely follows the 
trepidation of the second. The problematization of the utility and validity of the natural 
sciences in producing meaningful statements about humanity casts light on the very notion of 
meaningfulness, and leads inevitably to the formation of an entirely new scientific discourse: 
the modem human sciences. Fourthly, we will open the angle of our approach to focus on 
Edmund Husserl, the founder of modem phenomenology, in an attempt to situate his 
historical approach to the crisis of the “European Sciences” in the Weimar Kulturkampf and 
to connect his relationship to the three previous axes of crisis. I will thereby suggest a number 
of socio-political consequences of the forceful analysis of his later writings and, in particular, 
in his last major work The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy 
(1935).
1. Crisis as Historical Specificity
1.1. The Cultural Crisis of the Weimar Republic
Though Germany was driven to unconditional capitulation in the autumn of 1918, the story of 
the final moments of World War I is one of a continent in a state of exhaustion. Everywhere 
and on all levels, European culture showed itself to be at the end of its civilizational 
resources. A war which was to have last only several months had drawn brutally and bloodily 
on for four years. Belief in the decisiveness of modem warfare had lead the three power 
blocks to enter into conflict defining neither their objectives nor the limits to which they were 
prepared to go before yielding in the face of resistance. The complex constellation of 
European actors created cross-firing conflicts with unclear or even irrational ambitions, 
without mechanisms of control, and handicapped by inconsequential political coordination.’ 
At the same time, the final months of the war in the autumn of 1918 were marked hy 
numerous declarations of national sovereignty and the formation of hitherto unknown states. 




























































































all declared in the course of four days. The assertion of national particularity combined with 
mass desertions and general chaos, consigned the initiatives which opened the war to 
oblivion, and pointed up the irrelevance of countless war enterprises. Indeed it was Germany 
that was forced to unconditional capitulation; but that capitulation was made in the face of 
evident lack of will on the European continent to continue a war without reason.
The first four years of the Weimar Republic, declared in 1926, were marked by 
constant internal conflict approaching civil war. The notion of unified national consensus was 
invisible until the dissolution of parliament in July 1930 by the Briining government, after 
which a more a systematic attempt was made to assemble and unify all the non-center parties 
into either larger parties or large coalitions. The result of the streamlining was monumental 
and clearly changed the national trajectory: not the least the NSDAP, Hitler’s until then
relatively marginalized party, went from 12 to 107 representatives.’
In his cultural history of the Weimar Republic, Peter Gay maps out the 
corresponding cultural disunity, evoking the notion of Weimar as a double political entity, 
"the Germany of military swagger, abject submission to authority, aggressive foreign 
adventure, and obsessive pre-occupation with form, and the Germany of lyric poetry, 
Humanist philosophy, and pacific cosmopolitanism”.' Gay’s thesis is that, with the realization 
that the Kealpolitik of Bismarck and Schlieffen had only iead to catastrophe for Germany and 
that another approach had to be attempted. For some, the answers to the question “whither 
Germany” is: toward the past. The innovation of Weimar is retrospection. The difficult 
question is “which past?” What elements of the German past are usable toward the creation of 
a “new” (old) Germany? Which are acceptable or even legitimate? In what sense can the past 
constitute a building block of the future? What is the roll of historical continuity in the 
delicate balance of rejection and rehabilitation of the past?
Thus the questions involved in the constitution of a political and historical 
continuity at the end of the First World War, and in the construction of a “new” constitutional 
republic correspond to a large degree to the notion of crisis as we have defined it above: the 
self-constitution or self-conceptualization of any thinkable entity is always a crisis. It is 
always a struggle between the mandate of novelty combined with the unavoidability of 234
2 Norman Davies, Europe. A History. London. Oxford University Press, pp. 901-10.
3 Hajo Holborn, Deutsche Geschichte der Neuzeit. Band III: Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1871- 
1945). Fischer Taschenbueh Verlag, 1981, p. 461; Karl Dietrich Erdmann. Die Weimarer Republik. Stuttgart. 
Klepp Verlag, 1973, pp. 275-6. Horst Moller. Weimar. Die unvollendete Demokralie. Miinchen. Deutscher 
Taschenbueh Verlag, pp. 186-88.




























































































utilizing the building blocks—memories, culture, structures and institutions—imported or 
derived from the past. By all accounts imperial Germany was a consummate failure. It was 
politically, if not morally, impossible to relocate the axis of the new Germany along the lines 
of Wilhelmian values and policies. At the same time, the notion that there existed a “better” 
foundation for the new Germany, presupposes not only that something is retrievable from the 
past, and that that past is also German. In other words, the logic of the new beginning and 
cultural rejuvenation requires a reaffirmation that the new is not completely new, that the new 
is actually somehow old, and that the old is largely relevant as the new.
Virtually all the dominant minds of the Weimar Republic, be it intellectuals, 
business people or politicians, had been educated and developed culturally during the period 
prior to the War. Their Weltanschauung was based on a value system that was more or less 
estranged from the present. Their influence derived its weight from its appeal to a system of 
legitimacy and authority foreign to the norms and values of the new age.’ In this regard, the 
culture of Weimar is marked by its lack of unity, by its double identity, and by the rupture in 
its conceptions of historical meaning and value. Art, literature, music, architecture, 
philosophy all straddle historical systems of reference and value orientation. All were partly 
foreign, partly domestic, proper to a new era, and proper to an old one. This is the sense of 
Gay’s subtitle “the outsider as insider”.
Parallel to the axis of the old and the new, cultural expression was often 
understood along the axis of nationalism—anti-natioanlism understood as identical to the axis 
republicanism—anti-republicanism. Thus the expressionist movements of the period 
immediately before the War were scorned by cultural conservatives. The modern architecture 
and design of the Bauhaus group (Gropius, Behrens, Mendelssohn, Mies van der Rohe), 
established before the war, also fell in cultural political disfavor among those who sought a 
national cultural expression, against the universalizing and a-historical references of modem 
expression. Modernist writers like Rilke and Cleats struggled with the demand for a certain 
wholeness, for coherence and systematic social, spiritual, cultural totality, and the need to 
draw upon the myths and legends of a particularly German past, and to distance themselves 
from the a-historical tendencies of the new democratic republicanism."
The most prominent illustration of Weimar cultural schizophrenia is the case of 
Thomas Mann, whose famous public date with his older brother Heinrich and subsequent *6
s Holbom, p. 441.




























































































"conversion” to democracy serves as a model of the deep contradictions in virtually any 
attempt to form a systematic approach to cultural-political reconstruction. The point of 
departure of his Observations of an Unpolitical Man (published in 1918), begun during the 
first years of the War, is radically different from the position that Mann assumes in the 
1920’s, during the years preceding the proclamation of the Weimar Republic.’ As Mann 
himself admonishes in 1920, “The Observations was thus a polemic pamphlet, but indeed 
also a passionate piece of work of self-research and of revision of my foundations, but self­
research is still mostly the first step in a change, and 1 learned that no one remains where he 
was, when he learns to know himself... In short, the democratic confession was on the tip of 
my tongue and insisting to be expressed. 1 thank my guardian angel that I did not hold it 
back”.’ Republicanism was, to borrow a modem expression, “politically correct”. It was a 
concept, in other words, with its own political rewards and sanctions.
On the political landscape, the tension between imperial traces of the Wilhelmian 
empire and the rationality of democratic republicanism also created the need for sociological, 
political, and scientific analysis that lead forth to some of the greatest works of history and 
politics of this century. Weimar culture is in many ways a paradigm for culture understood as 
change and creativity. Deeply troubled, it offered apparently unparalleled conditions for 
productivity. On the one hand, the four years of the Republic consist of one single civil war— 
there was a renaissance of the military elements of state administration, political 
assassination, inflation, the catastrophic Versailles Treaty, the Kapp Putsch, the French 
occupation of the Ruhr, and the tenacity of the association between the industrial complex 
and the aristocratic elements of society. Not only Germany, but also the entire Western World 
experienced the memory of WW 1 as psychosis that went far beyond simple demoralization.’ 
Indeed its fissures and troubles present themselves as the very preconditions of cultural 
creation.
Academic institutions suffered the same tensions as the open cultural life. 
However, though the large majority of prominent writers tended to be liberal in their 
relationship to the Republic and its past, intellectuals holding posts in the academic 
institutions represented the hotbed of conservatism.The republican governments of the 
Lander, which controlled and administered the public universities took little initiative toward 7
7 Erdmann, pp. 245-6.
“ Thomas Mann "Kullur und Politik”, Betrachlungen eines Unpolitischen. Gesammelte Werke in 
Dreizehn Bdnden, Band 12. Stuttgart. Fischer Tasehenbuch Vertag, 1990. p. 853.




























































































carrying out republican reform within the walls of the academy. Most of the universities were 
dominated conservative scholars who were by and large opposed to reform. Thus little or 
nothing was attempted in the name of strengthening the ideology of the “entire man” nor 
toward a limiting of the class based hierarchies that had traditionally been the bulwark of the 
faculties. Indeed it was the very democratic ideals which impeded principled reform."
1.2. The Crisis in the Natural Sciences
Crisis does not spring forth like a Big Bang from the emptiness of cosmic nothingness. It is a 
link in a chain of historical self-representations. It is mode of transition and of tradition, a 
mode of understanding ourselves in time, with respect to others who came before, with their 
concomitant bumbling and brilliance, and of our own conception of our place in the future. 
Creation, be it scientific our artistic, is a struggle within this temporal coliseum. For the “new 
scientists” of the 16th century, the situation was no different, indeed they have become, 
thanks to Husserl and others, the model for model-breaking: The background to our story of 
crisis in the first decades of the 20th century is the crisis which opened modernity in the 17th 
century.
The revolution in the scientific universe is prepared by revolution in virtually all 
other domains of human existence. The rise of “modem” political thought accompanies the 
decline of the Catholic Church as the institutional equivalent of the World, and the rise of the 
notion of the modem state, thereafter the nation-state, as the central axis of relation between 
human beings and their social surroundings. The multiplicity of cultures and the decline of 
the Latin language mark the growing legitimization of cultural particularity.
In the history of science, Modernity begins as the reconsideration of the scientific 
methodology of Antiquity. The key to the catastrophic reopening of the Greek mathematical 
and physical ideals, is not a theoretical hut a pragmatic one. For it is a question of which tasks 
may be asked of mathematics and physics in particular, and the natural sciences in general. 
That radically new and virtually unthinkable aspect which inaugurates Modernity is therefore 
neither a revolutionary theory, nor newly discovered empirical material. It is a mutation in the 
field of application of the dominating scientific model.





























































































On the other hand, during the last years of the 19th century and the early decades 
of the 20th a breathtaking decline in a singular form of modem self-understanding 
accelerates towards oblivion. The hard-won scientific orthodoxy of five centuries is shaken 
and begins to crumble in the course of a handful of decades. It is the mechanical conception 
of the universe, characterized by a convergence of logic, geometry and physics. This 
breakdown of the scientific model is accompanied by the breakdown of an entire world view, 
that of "common sense”. The intellectual structure of the bourgeois European reality 
depended confidently and blindly on the power of science and scientific analysis to organize 
and demythologize the world, liberate it from the unpredictable grasp of religion and the 
supernatural. The scientific elan of the 17th century had already cleared the way for the 
economic development of the 18lh and 19lh centuries. On the one hand, the by-product of 
scientific discovery—technology—proved itself to be the fundamental ally of capitalistic 
development, opening discoveries of new fields and new techniques. On the other, science as 
ideology cleared the way for the notions of predictability and stability. Lastly it produced a 
notion of evolution which was immediately coopted by the doctrines of capitalism in order to 
found the endless necessity of economic expansion.”
Science had rendered nature safe for free enterprise. Common sense and 
"intuition” were not only the names of a certain relationship to the nature world. They became 
values within a system which surpassed them, they became functions of an ideology that was 
external to them and which never had seen the light of day in debates or discussions of how or 
what the world is. The universe was understood as mechanical in accordance with a kind of 
visual model. The senses were the ultimately dependable measure of the coherence of the 
external world. Judgment, intuition and reason, while arguably both socially and ideologically 
determined, were understood as the definitive basis for a grasp of human reality, the 
foundation of the naturality of nature.
The crisis of the natural sciences at the turn of the century consists of an 
uncoupling of science and intuition. The “real” as it is postulated by specialists of the natural 
sciences was suddenly no longer attached to the real as it is experienced by laymen and civil 
leaders who sought to construct industrial empires on the footings of empirical




























































































predictability.1' Both physics, chemistry and mathematics were characterized hy their 
pragmatic aspirations and their rigorous appeal to the mechanics of intuition.'*
The 19th century saw both the institutionalization of mathematics, their 
widespread teaching and social circulation and its application to standard problems of 
astronomy and physics. At the same time, pure mathematics began to develop theories and 
methods for the study of abstract mathematical entities such as imaginary numbers (GauR), 
complex functions (Riemann), number theory (Dirichlet), irrational numbers (Weierstrass), 
synthetic geometry (Steiner, von Staudt), hyperbolic geometry (Lobatschewski/Bolyai), 
topology (Mobius), chaos (Poincare), divergent series, tensor analysis, differential geometry, 
group theory and fractals.” At the same time, a continuity assumed between the world and the 
natural sciences, between spirit and matter, was understood as the basis of the unity between 
philosophy and the natural sciences since the Renaissance. Theoretical mathematics was the 
foundation. The great philosophers of Renaissance rationalism—Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, 
Pascal, Malebranche, etc.—were also its central mathematicians. The major philosophers of 
the 19th century had nearly no relationship to the developments in mathematics in the latter 
half of the 19th century, and no relationship to the fundamental presuppositions of these 
developments, namely the rise of non-Euclidean geometry .
Parallel fields of the natural sciences saw similar paradigm shifts. In astronomy 
the consequences of the research of Kepler and Laplace had long been investigated and the 
movement and characteristics of our solar system thoroughly explored. (Neptune was 
discovered in 1846, though Pluto only m 1930). The new horizon, however, sprung out of the 
consequences of the new theories of spectroscopy, the measurement of movement and 
position based on the measurement in the characteristics of light emitted by objects.” This 
understanding of the nature of light spectrums offered the ultimate preparation for the theory 
of general relativity, which was to completely shake all previous conceptions of space and 
time. In chemistry, the revolution in conceptions of the nature of matter, of atoms and 
molecules, the organization of elements in the periodic system, and the beginnings of organic 
chemistry all prepared the terrain for the immanent breakdown of the “materiality” of matter, 
and thus of the common sense conception of the “reality” of matter. The definitive shattering 1
11 Hobsbawn, p 245.
Jean Rosmorduc. Une hisloire de la physique el de la chemie. De Thales d Einstein. Paris. Editions 
du Seuil, 1985, pp. 235-7
15 Hans Joachim Storig. Weltgeschichte der Wissenschaft. Natur- and Geisteswissenschaflen des 19. und 
20. Jahrhunderts. Augsburg. Weltbild Verlag, 1992, pp. 60-7



























































































of intuition as foundation for the understandable world, however, comes in the field of
• .■ /  *
physic^ Indeed the force of the Newtonian paradigm and the mechanical model of 
only made the revolution more dramatic. An entire series of discoveries 
around the turn of the century served to turn the Newtonian system upside down. In 1895 
Rdntgen discovered the yet unheard of properties of certain kinds of elements to penetrate 
matter itself. This lead to a more general understanding of radioactivity and of the mutability 
of matter. In the late I860’s and 70’s the notion of the electron was first developed. It was 
understood as both matter and non-matter, weightless, yet showing signs of inertia, 
electrically charged, yet changing. Max Planck’s quantum theory, which in 1918 earns him 
the Nobel Prize in physics, inaugurates a new understanding of the relationship between 
matter and energy, claiming that they are both transformable and transmissible only in 
discrete packets or quanta. And finally, the nail in the coffin of Newton mechanics is 
Einstein's Theory of Special Relativity, demonstrating that space and time are a function of 
movement, not the inverse, that movement is somehow absolutely measurable with respect to 
an absolute reference in space and time. Further technological advances permit repeated 
testing and confirmation of the theory.
1.3. The Origin of the Human Sciences.
The movement, in all the natural sciences, toward a disconnection of scientific thought from 
its material foundations and from its concern with the practical suppositions and 
consequences of physical reality, has profound implications for the notion of Truth. This is 
the case, on the one hand, for Truth understood as metaphysical insight into the reality of 
universe, and, on the other, the establishment of simple criteria for the verification of any 
statement about the world at all. Indeed, it might be said that the crisis of philosophy at the 
turn of the century begins with a general collapsing of the distinction between reality and 
statements about it. With the rise of focusing on abstraction, on thought-models and 
constructions, on natural science as a metaphysical discipline, the foundations for 
understanding the concrete world as a simple set of facts become far more distant. “Common 
sense”, as it were, takes it on the chin. Claims about the factual condition of the world (“Rain 
is falling on Birmingham”) fall into disrepute beside claims about the abstract condition of 
reality (“4th dimensional space is asymmetrically curved”).
The concept of positivism apparently originates from St. Simon (1760-1825) and 




























































































traced to the British empiricist tradition of the 18th century. Positivism is reborn in the 20th 
century in the form of Logical Positivism, through the research of a small group associated 
with a certain variety of analytic and linguistic philosophy, and marked by a deep respect for 
the natural sciences and a disdain for metaphysics. More formally it originated in a group of 
German and Austrian philosophers in what came to be known as the Vienna Circle. The 
group emerged out of a seminar held at the University of Vienna by Moritz Schlick (1882- 
1936). In 1929 the group produce a program paper entitled “Scientific Worldview" in which it 
laid out its common principles and took the name “Vienna Circle". In 1930 the group begin 
regular publication of the journal Erkenntnis which appeared until the Annexation of Austria 
in 1938, which made further collaboration impossible. The main members, such as Otto 
Neurath, Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Kurt Godel, Philipp Frank, Hans Reichenbach, and 
Rudolf Carnap, an earlier student of Husserl. The Vienna Circle was deeply influenced by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein who developed a general theory of language and of the relationship 
between language and the world. Wittgenstein claimed that all linguistic formulations were 
logical “pictures” of possible facts." A statement is meaningful, he claimed, only when it 
determines the range of conditions in which it is true, in other words, only when it provides 
the necessary conditions for the world in which it would be true. Except from this definition 
are (1) tautologies (“The car is blue or the car is not blue”) and (2) contradictions. (“The car is 
blue and the car is not blue”). The former arc true in all possible worlds; the latter arc true in 
no possible worlds. Logical Positivism used this theory of meaningful statements in order to 
develop a doctrine denouncing metaphysical statements as meaningless, defining them as 
neither tautological nor contradictory.
Logical Positivism is thus a fundamental attitude that attempts to develop a map 
of reality in terms of tightly defined “meaningful" statements. The result is that Logic 
Positivism argues that the most appropriate and dependable strategy for reflection is to 
concern oneself exclusively with that which is “positively” given, in other words, with what is 
immediately, clearly, unambiguously available to any individual through sensory experience. 
Only rigorous “positive" descriptions are admissible. In short, what is true is what may be 
observed. The polemical point is that there is nothing hidden behind the facts, no essence, no 
higher reality, no eternal wisdom. There are just facts. Thus positivism rejects all forms of 
metaphysics, all differentiation between what is available to us here and now and what may or





























































































may not lie beyond or behind what is available here and now. However with the bathwater of 
metaphysics Logical Positivism throws out not only the baby of moral or aesthetic judgments, 
statements of religious or spiritual belief, but also any and all expression of emotion or human 
subjectivity.
Thus at the turn of the 20lh century, the natural sciences and philosophy find 
themselves at each other’s mutual disservice. It is not enough that the mitlennia-long struggle 
for the acquisition of knowledge and the extension of the limits of the human world has been 
arduous, it has constantly been plagued by another problem. The long history of the natural 
sciences has always been tormented by the question of what the natural sciences actually are, 
what their conditions and limits, functions, tasks and obligations are to be. Until deep into the 
19th century the particularity of human beings as objects of scientific research was never in 
question. A sort of no-holds-barred historical positivism was practiced in all branches of what 
today is called human sciences. Historiography was indeed a science, that is, a systematic and 
methodological mapping-out of the facts, which in all self-evidence are supposed as the most 
basic expression of what has been. The oft-cited call to order of Leopold Ranke for the 
historian to reproduce the past as it “actually was” is only the tip of a enormous 
historiographical iceberg.
Thus to the list of the other foundering institutions of fin-de-siecle mentality must 
also be added historiography, known, until the 1880's as the grandfather of the human 
sciences. What today is an obvious methodological question was posed one hundred years 
ago as a methodological wrench in the works: what is the difference between human and non­
human objects? What are the scientific implications of the difference between a tiger-lilly and 
an expressionist painting? This very same question was posed by neo-kantian philosophy at 
the turn of the 20lh century. The failure of the natural sciences, was always understood as the 
failure of theoretical formulations to construct a viable representation of the empirical world. 
The crisis that leads to foundation of the human sciences as such is, however, a critic of the 
capacity for science to reach an understanding of the human sciences at all.
During the first half of the 18th century European historiography was under the 
domination of German Romantic philosophy. This tradition, which displaces the pre- 
Renaissance cyclical theories of history, the heritage of Antiquity reaches back to Herder’s 
Reflections on the Philosophy o f the History o f Mankind (1784-9) and its double logic of 
historical teleology and subjective rationality, and is arguably completed in Hegel’s Lectures 




























































































relation between and nature is fundamental. History and Reason are inextricably associated 
through a discourse of origin, development, and goal. The factual course of history, the set of 
empirical events which we take to be the history of the world are understood as the outer 
surface of some inner function of universal truth. Events are manifestations of truth, in 
development, truth in denaturalized form, seeking to rediscover its nature. To seize the 
meaning of the world in general and the past in particular it is not enough to merely assemble 
the events as such, it is necessary to seek the implicit rationality in events. Historical 
“objectivity” will not suffice because human beings are deeply entwined in the movement of 
history. The implicit rationality of historical processes cannot be clearly differentiated from 
the historical processes of our understanding of ourselves. History is to varying degrees also a 
subjective operation. Historical research is human research, subjectivity and objectivity are 
inseparable. In this way the Romantic fascination with nature can be understood less as a 
privileging of the wild and irrational forces of nature, as the insistence on the continuity of the 
universe, on the naturality of human beings. To seek nature is to seek oneself. The individual 
is “natural” and the experience of nature is an experience of one’s own naturality. The 
individual profitably seeks insight into its own historical reality by seeking out its position in 
the harmonious totality of the universe. The importance of historical events varies according 
to time.
At least three variations of the idealist-romantic paradigm can be identified, a 
theory of progress, a theory of salvation, and a theory of decline. According to the idealist- 
romantic theory of progress, time itself is meaningful, time is the measure of the varying 
rationality of events. In conformity with the principles of teleology, the future promises 
deeper, more meaningful insight into the rationality of the world. From the point of view of 
the individual historian, the present is inferior to the future. The theory of salvation 
supplements the theory of progress with the promise of particular historical phases, and with 
the insistence on a concrete goal at which the meaning of the world corresponds with a 
redemption of the difficulty of the journey there. The most remarkable modem examples of 
this model are Hegel, and Marx. The theory of decline is based on the same structure and 
historical rationality but, obviously, with the opposite consequences. Here the Golden Age is 
endless lost in the past, and historical time is merely the purveyor of loss. Schopenhauer 
offers the most pregnant illustration of this point of view.
The middle of the 19th century sees an exhaustion of the idealist-romantic 




























































































gradation of meaningfulness so prominent in idealist-romantic conceptions of time and 
history. The fundamental principle of historicist method is that otherwise differing historical 
objects have nonetheless equal value, the object in itself is interesting as object. This implies 
that not only different periods, but also different economic, geographical, ethnic, religious, 
social levels and categories cannot be judged by the historian, since they are assumed to have 
the same value in the eyes of the historian, or, in the words of Leopold Ranke, “all periods are 
equally close to God".
Thus a clear displacement in the notion of scientific objectivity can be seen. 
Henceforth the values of historical-temporal evolution are replaced by the those of equality, 
tolerance, liberalism, humanism, etc. Scientific objectivity, in other words is henceforth 
understood as the basis lor historical understanding. Accordingly methodological 
developments build upon the notion of critique of sources, systematic methods, and the 
fuctuality of the questions. The notion of historical meaning is set aside in favor of analyses 
of factual situations. Interpretation of the facts is an operation foreign to historical analysis.
Consequently, historicism introduces a powerful delimitation of the field of 
scientific research. Not only is the notion of historical meaning significantly impoverished, 
but the question of human subjectivity so central to the idealist-romantic model becomes 
largely marginalized. According to historicism human beings can only be understood as 
objects for historical research, as a set of data expressing the empirical reality of humans. A 
symphony of Beethoven is understood as the time interval of notes and the wavelength of 
audio signals. Historicism is not preoccupied with problems of interpretation of facts, it is a 
methodology based on the assumption that there is nothing more interesting than facts." In its 
meeting with hermeneutics at the lum of the 20th century, however, the science of history 
will meet the human sciences in a test of the humanity of historiography.
Hermeneutics is the doctrine of understanding or interpretation. It thus develops 
theoretical principles for the generation of meaning, and how meaning in turn leads to the 
further creation of meaning. One meaningful object—a novel, a painting, a building, etc.— 
gives rise to others. It is indeed the concept understanding which presents the turning point 
in the battle for science, or rather for the scientificity of science. Modernity was 
conceptualized by Descartes, Newton, Kepler, and—as well shall see with respect to Husserl- 
-Galileo, as a purification of explanation as the objective, non-interfering relationship to the
“ Paul Veynes, Comment on écrit l'histoire. Suivi de Foucault révolutionne l'histoire. Paris. Editions 




























































































object of science. In 1937 Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-89) published Historik in which he 
proposed the use of the notion of explanation understood as the analytical alternative to 
understanding." Scientific research is an activity which necessarily produces meaning. The 
distinction made by both historicism and the natural sciences in general since the Renaissance 
is based on the validity of two different types of research objects. Natural sciences pretend to 
explain, while historians pretend to understand. Droysen simply asks whether this distinction 
is appropriately grounded. Droysen’s critique of historicism builds upon a critique of this 
opposition. Any positivistic historiographical strategy relies on a need for absolute 
differentiation between explanation and understanding, and, moreover, builds its 
“understanding” of history on a purely “explanatory" method. If historiography wishes to 
make a claim to scientificity, it must first be able to clarify which historical facts are relevant 
for any given problematic. Explanatory strategies are defined as those which do not apply 
discriminating criteria to scientific objects. For such criteria would be, by definition, 
unscientific. In order to be science, historiography must take cognizance of its own activity, 
it must be self-reflexive and apply a self-conscience understanding to its activity. It short, it 
must be that which it has always sought to distance itself from. Historiography’s self- 
constituting moment is its own identity crisis.
Despite reproaches to the contrary, Droysen’s intention was nothing less than to 
legitimate historiography as a science. In attempting to do so he constructed a connection 
between the historicism of the 19th century and 20th century hermeneutics that was to open 
the way to the contemporary human sciences. And yet by laying the foundation for the 
revolution in the natural sciences—in the humanity of the natural sciences and the naturality 
of the human sciences—he opened the door to the scientific legitimacy of the human sciences. 
The final brick in the construction of that edifice was provided by the philosophical 
movement known as Neokantianism, and above all by the Wilhelm Windclband (1848-1915) 
and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) Neokantianism leads a critique this methodology and 
thereby revises the status of human beings as objects of history. Simplifying we can say that 
Windelband and Rickert were interested in developing a doctrine describing the conditions of 
scientific knowledge, a fundamental concern of Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason (1781). The 
Kantian revolution held that the conditions of possibility for certain knowledge of nature were 
proper to humans, not a part of nature itself. We thus meet a slightly more philosophical
19 “Das Wesen des historischen Menschen ist forschend zu verstehen". Johann Gustav Droysen,




























































































version of Droysen’s own provocative claim that a certain self-reflexivity is necessary for any 
scientific attitude toward nature. Windelband and Rickert confirm, in good Kantian tradition, 
that knowledge of nature presupposes knowledge of human beings. The frontier between 
natural science and human science is thus eroded in the very moment it is formed.”
2. The History of Science as the History of Crisis
2.1. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)
Edmund Husserl was born on April 8, 1859 to German speaking Jewish parents in Prossnitz 
in Moravia, then a part of the Habsburg Empire, in the territory that is now the Czech 
Republic.11 Husserl himself converted to Protestantism at the age of 27. In 1876 he moved to 
Leipzig, where he studied astronomy, mathematics and physics, and some philosophy. From 
1878 he continued his studies in Berlin, then in Vienna. He earned a doctorate in mathematics 
in 1883 for a dissertation on the theory of variations. From 1884 to 1886 he attended the 
philosophy lectures of Brenlano in Vienna. Following Brentano’s advice he moved to Halle in 
order to study under Carl Slrumpf, one of Brentano’s students, and to prepare the Habilitation 
on the concept of number.
In 1887 Husserl was made Privatdozent at the University of Halle, working on 
questions of logic and the foundations of mathematics. He published his first book in 1891, 
Philosophy of Arithmetic. In 1900 he published that Platonic Prolegomena to Pure Logic, the 
introductory first volume to the Logical Investigations, whose second volume was published 
the following year. The book won him an assistant professorship at the University of 
Gottingen, a well-known center for mathematical research, where Husserl collaborated with 
David Hilbert. He was appointed to a chair in 1906. In 1916 he accepted a call to the 
University of Freiburg where he succeeded the Heinrich Rickert, the instrumental philosopher 
in the rise of neo-kantianism. It was in Freiburg that Husserl began his association with 
Martin Heidegger. By the early 1920’s Husserl was the leading philosopher in Germany. In 
1929 he retired from his chair and was succeeded by Heidegger. Thereafter he published *
20 Both Rickert, Dilthey and others sought to develop a differentiation between the human sciences 
(“cultural sciences”) and the natural sciences. Rickert proposes focusing on methodological differences, 




























































































Fonnal and Transcendental Logic and, in 1931, Cartesian Mediations. From around 1933 
Husserl began to experience problems associated with the rise of the NSDAP. Because of his 
Jewish background he was deprived of his library privileges at the University of Freiburg by 
his former student and colleague Heidegger, who became rector of the University in the same 
year. By 1935, feeling acutely the political situation in Germany, Husserl begin seeking ways 
to have his work removed to safety abroad. He died in April, 1938.
Husserl’s career is typically divided into three periods. The first encompasses his 
confrontation with the psychologistic position in the foundations of arithmetic in an effort to 
establish an objective foundation for logic and mathematics within human psychology. The 
second period corresponds to the development of the terms of his own system of 
phenomenology understood as transcendental idealism. The third period encompasses his 
work toward embedding the very individual terms of phenomenology in a system of 
intersubjectivity, culture and history. It is this final period, leading ultimately to the 
posthumous Crisis in the European Sciences, published in 1935, which will be of primary 
interest for us.“
2.2. The transformation of mathematics in the Renaissance and the return to Euclid.
In his Prolegomena to Pure Logic, published in 1900, the same year as Max Planck’s 
Quantum Theory, and Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, Husserl makes a direct 
contribution to the positivism debate mentioned above. The work simultaneously supports the 
premises of positivism—that the only reliable foundation for knowledge is that which is 
immediately given—and radically modifies it procedures. The originality of the work is its 
distinction between the process of thinking, the “thought act”, as he formulates it, and the 
content of thinking. The former, claims Husserl, is in indeed a fact, in line with the criteria 
and aspirations of logical positivism. In other words, it can be studied and analyzed as a 
factual thing without entering in any dialogue with the meaningfulness of the content of
21 In the following three paragraphs draws on biographical information found in Barry Smith and David 
Woodruff Smith. “Introduction” to The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Barry Smith and David Woodruff 
Smith (eds ). Cambridge. Cambridge University Press 1995, pp. 1-8.
22 The first half of the what is today the standard edition first appeared in Philosophia I (1936), pp. 77- 
176. The longer version of the work was first published posthumously in the Husserliana Edition by Nijhoff 
(The Hague) and since 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers (Dordrecht/Boston/London) as Die Krisis der 
europaischen Wissenschaften und die iranszendentale Phanomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die 




























































































thought. The intention of thought—what thought aims at or “wishes” to think—is completely 
independent of the structure of thinking. Philosophy, he claims, has neglected to explore this 
structural aspect of thinking. Psychology in particular is guilty of blurring what is thought 
with the way it is thought. Husserl sees his mission as the liberation of logic and the structure 
of thought from its unclear status in psychology. Through the distinction made in his early 
works, Husserl thereby founds a new “positive” science which in principle will significantly 
advance the frontier of what is concretely knowable.
In the Platonic scientific tradition the notion of “ideal” space poses no problems. 
It is in fact the presupposition of the “idealism” of the entire system. According to Plato, 
reality is graduated. Reality is not entirely associated with the existence of non-existence of 
any given object. Some objects are indeed “more” real than others. The reality of a given 
object is a reflection of its proximity to ideal being. Some “things" exist on higher planes of 
being than others.
The notion that the universe is somehow homogeneously rational is thus an 
essential mark of the modem. It is the basis for a conception of the natural sciences which 
envisages a systematic rational enterprise destined to take hold of and dominate a systematic, 
rational world. The reasoning behind the raison d'etre of modem science then quickly 
accelerates into the modem notion of progress: infinity of objects, infinity of means, infinity 
of tasks, infinity of progress. In other words, just as reality is an endless set of ideal forms in 
good platonic tradition, the natural sciences face an endless set of scientific tasks which will 
nonetheless never be capable of exhausting the endlessness of its material capabilities.
Three key elements hold this new world-view together. All three will be essential 
for the notion of crisis with which Husserl operates. First, that the universe is a rational 
totality, second, that the natural sciences, invention of the new humanity, are a rational 
instrument-, third that there is a general applicability of the (rational) natural sciences on the 
(rational) totality of existing things. As Husserl himself notes, the relationship between the 
ontological claim about the rationality of the universe and the epistemological claim about the 
rationality of the new scientific methods are mutually determinate: the one provides support 
for the other.
(1) As we have already suggested, the new age of science that begins in the 
Renaissance is concomitantly a new age of ontology. In other words, the conception of what
European Sciences and Transcendenal Philosophy. Introduction to Phenomenological Philosopy. Translated by 




























































































exists is linked to the conception of what knowing it presupposes and what knowing it 
implies.
(2) Thus in his Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes seeks to construct a 
science worthy of the rational world of which it is supposed to be the mirror. Yet despite the 
fact that a new understanding of the world as rationality dominates both philosophy and the 
natural sciences, the structure of the scientific method developed to handle it is well over a 
millennium old. Like many in his philosophical generation, Descartes takes Euclidean 
geometry to be the model of all theoretical science. A science such as physics should be based 
on first principles comparable with the axioms of geometry, which were discovered and 
validated through the systematic analysis of intuitive ideas. Descartes thought, for example, 
that the law of inertia could be seen to be true through the use of reason alone. This view, that 
science can be based on principles that are revealed through introspection, is characteristic of 
Descartes' rationalism.
(3) What then remains from this conceptual-ontological overhauling of science is 
two forms of rationality, a methodological one and one focused on the nature of reality. Yet 
the conceptual tools used to form theories about the nature of reality are already rationalistic 
in their very nature. Through the glass of rationalism we see only a rational universe which 
then requires a rational methodology in order to be understood. In other words, the frontier 
between the rational and the non-rational is not just one frontier among others. It is the 
frontier of all frontiers, the one which enables us to draw conclusions about objects, their 
properties, and their limits. The operation by which the rationality of natural science is 
applied to the rationality of nature is the great development of Renaissance philosophy, and 
the modem individual is henceforth defined as one who exercises the power of assembly of 
the threefold elements of existence: rationality, science, and reality.
According to Husserl, the history of science since Antiquity corresponds to the 
development and idealization of this structure. The meaning of science, he suggests, has 
always already been loaded with the need to realize or concretize a kind of ideal form 
(Konstitutionsgebilde) of what human subjectivity—the human relationship to the concrete 
world—actually is, provided it develops itself sufficiently. What should stand in the way of 
that? The difficulty implicit in this ideal of the European sciences is that it requires that an 
infinite research project be completed through finite means. The ideal of the sciences as 
universal and ultimately grounded activity supposes that the objective world can in some way 




























































































to exhaust the complete set of research objects which its premises can generate. This means 
that all the objects belonging to the concrete world must somehow be tom out of their 
apparently endless mundaneness and anonymity, and given particular, individual meaning.”
Still, despite its Euclidean roots, the discovery of this paradox does not belong 
to Antiquity. The insight in the endlessness of the scientific task is rather the mark of 
modernity. It is part of both modem epistemology, the concern with the presuppositions and 
limits of knowledge, and of modem ontology, a new conception of the relationship between 
real existing individuals and the world in which they live. Just how commensurable is the 
conception of the infinity of field of natural sciences and the infinity of mankind? Are 
humans capable of designing and carrying out a scientific project capable of exhausting the 
field of all scientific objects? And is that what “universality” really means? Finding the “one” 
correct question to ask of the entire universe, then dedicating infinite effort to extracting the 
answer? In other words, the general critique of Enlightenment themes of universality so 
prevalent in the fields of cultural studies today, has a precursor in the Renaissance 
“philosophy” of the natural sciences.
In this sense the relationship between the physical world and human
understanding of the physical world must be seen from both a subjective and an objective
point of view. From the objective point of view, the aspiration, or rather the assumption that 
the project of objectively knowing the world is realizable has, since the early days of our 
century, been associated with “physicalism” or “physical objectivism”, and with the doctrines 
of Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism. We will return to their arguments shortly. For 
the moment, let us simply note that they see the aim of science, and indeed the aim of the 
philosophy of science, as a clarification of the world as it is. “Physical reality” is the only
valid measure for any claims about the world. The physical world is what it is, and true
scientific claims about it can be arrived upon by simply clearing away impediments to contact 
with it. From the subjective point of view, the conception of the world as an object or a set of 
objects that is fully understandable supposes a certain notion of human subjectivity. That 
human beings can somehow rise above the physical world, transcended it, and conceive it as a 
universal whole, making of it a completely coherent thought or conception is what Husserl 
and others have called the doctrine of “transcendental subjectivism”.
2.3. The Euclidean Enterprise




























































































Euclidean geometry provided Antiquity with a strictly formal conception of the universe. In 
other words, once we have understood and assimilated the definitions, axioms, and theorems 
which Euclid claims are universally valid for the universe, we can simply busy ourselves with 
applying them to any and every thinkable object. The reality of such objects is unimportant. 
Or, rather, the reality of the object consists in our capacity to think of it and apply the given 
rules to it. As far as “reality” is concerned, there is no interesting distinction to be made 
between a trapezoid which I imagine, a trapezoid drawn on the blackboard, and a trapezoid 
garage roof. The reality of the thing is solely a function of the validity of the definition which 
is applied. The question of existence becomes abstract, subjective, and transcendental. At the 
same time, human beings in Antiquity related far more immediately to the world than one 
could say we experience today. The reality of the world is dependent upon its immediate or 
relative presence to our perception. The environment is understood as the set of things that are 
visible or perceivable. Husserl claims that human beings in Antiquity were incapable of 
understanding this distinction between a scientific intellectual construction and their 
experience of the world. The difference between the physical world and the subjective world, 
or to use Husserl’s terms, the difference between “physical objectivism” and “transcendental 
subjectivism” is a novelty proper to modernity.
Euclid’s fundamental contribution to the mathematics of his period did not consist 
in new discoveries, but rather in a reorganization and systematization of the existing 
mathematical knowledge. Euclid’s Elements is built like the framework of an enormous 
building. It consists of three types of geometrical statements, definitions, postulates and 
axioms, proofs and theorems. It is assumed that the axioms are true, and that they may be 
used as presuppositions for logically valid reasoning which produces necessarily true 
conclusions. Euclid’s thought system is thus deductive, it provides the structure by which a 
certain number of true postulates may be used to deduce true statements about any number of 
objects.
As far as the philosophy of science is concerned, the greatest implication of this 
theory is its capacity to produce “true” conclusions about objects which as yet have not been 
observed. If we accept Euclid’s definitions of the point, the line, the angle, and the triangle, 
we must necessarily conclude with Euclid, for example, that the sum of the angles of any 
triangle is equivalent to a straight line (180 degrees). The important consequence is however 
that this theorem is now valid not only for those triangles which we can actually observe and 




























































































Consequently we suddenly find ourselves making claims about objects we have never seen, 
and which very well may not exist at all. Space and time in which these objects are thus 
supposed to exist no longer requires a verifiable set of objects in order to be meaningful. 
Space and time become henceforth the imaginary framework, or the imaginary horizon for 
our conception of ourselves in a world of triangles and other objects.
2.4. Galileo and the Birth of Modern Science
The discovery of the celestial movements had already been ascertained by the astronomers of 
Antiquity. With technical instruments, which paled compared to the advanced telescope and 
measuring devices used by Galileo, calculations, and observations were carried out which 
established the notion of natural law. Yet this conception of natural law is a far cry from the 
modem association of the “outer world” with the “inner world”. Modem science begins as the 
science of the unobservable. Instead of comparing theoretical suppositions with “real” 
observable, and thus measurable, data, modem science seeks to associate theories of reality 
with the unobserved, and in the end with the principally unobservable.
Galileo’s conflict with the Catholic Church is well known. By the end of 1609 he 
had successfully constructed a 20-power telescope that enabled him to detect previously 
unseen “planets" revolving around Jupiter, observe the phases of the planet Venus, and 
confirm, to his satisfaction, the Copemican theory of the heliocentric world system. The 
Church, which held the view that the earth was God’s central and primary creation, found the 
notion that the center of the universe should be elsewhere completely unacceptable. Despite 
Galileo’s appeal to the Grand Duchess Christina, the Holy Office at Rome issued an edict 
against Copemicanism in 1616. In 1623 Maffeo Barberini, who was more favorable to 
Galileo’s theories, became Pope Urban VIII, and Galileo received permission to write his 
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems in 1632, for which he was called to Rome 
and tried and condemned to life imprisonment for suspicion of heresy. The sentence was later 
commuted to house arrest.
The prosecution and the defense were largely incommensurate, the Church 
arguing on the basis of a principled world-view, while Galileo insisted to a large degree on 
the empirical material supporting his claims. Indeed Galileo defended himself before the Holy 




























































































proofs should not be subject to the scriptural interpretations." But Galileo was not condemned 
on the basis of empirical data. The foundation of prosecution of the Holy Office was a certain 
vision of the invisible. Of course Galileo had gone quite far to push back the threshold of the 
invisible. By perfecting and systematically applying the telescope he was able to observe and 
document more of the universe than ever had been done before. The spiritual-ideological 
battle field was, however, beyond, as the metaphysical framework of human self­
understanding. Indeed it is defined as beyond. Notwithstanding, the important critique of 
methods and presuppositions of data collection, empirical material in itself is uninteresting for 
the for the construction of reality. The conflict surrounding Galileo was a metaphysical one. It 
was concerned not with the empirical constitution of the world, but rather with the projection 
of the presuppositions, based on empirical facts, into the unknown and the invisible. It is thus 
a question of the function and limits of religion, which causes the scandal at the dawn of the 
modem. Galileo’s opening of modem science is not what he saw, but what he felt entitled to 
claim about what he didn't see. Modem science is bom of the formalization of modem 
science, of the understanding of the possibility and legitimacy of the projection of a formal or 
structural understanding of the universe on a universe of such enormous dimensions that it is 
radically unknowable in its entirety.
Oddly enough, Galileo is typically announced as the first modem scientist namely 
because he leaves theological models of understanding far behind." Galileo is praised more as 
mathematician than physicist. A researcher who focus on how phenomena take place, instead 
of what kind of essence lies behind them. His fusion of mathematics and philosophy of 
nature, which leads to the mathematization of nature which occupies Husserl, is understood as 
the purification of the natural sciences of their superstitious underpinnings. Still we must look 
again at the nature of modem science’s extrapolations, and ask what metaphysical 
presuppositions lie behind the infinitization of the here and now." Modem science is in a 
sense a new metaphysics, a new religion, a new superstition. It does not demand that we reject 
obsolete empirical evidence in place of new, but rather it demands that we reject the dominant 
doctrines of Christianity in favor of a new religion of the unknown and the unseen.
The key to the catastrophic reopening of the Greek mathematical and physical 
ideals, is not a theoretical but a pragmatic one. For it is a question of which tasks may be
24 Karl Von Gebler, Galileo Galilei und Die Romische Kune. Essen. Phaidon Verlag, pp. 343-47.
25 Cf., for example, Max Jammer, “Gesetz”, Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie, Helmut Seiffert & 
Gerard Radntzky (Hsgbrs). Miinchen. Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, p. 114.




























































































asked of mathematics and physics in particular, and the natural sciences in general. In 
Husserl’s view, modem science, beginning with Galileo’s improvements on Euclidean 
geometry has done an enormous service to the project of a construction of a comprehensive 
understanding of the world. That radically new and virtually unthinkable aspect which 
inaugurates modernity is therefore neither a revolutionary theory, nor newly discovered 
empirical material. It is a mutation in the field of application of the dominating scientific 
model.
The key to the continuity of this analysis of inflation of the natural sciences is a 
particular understanding of the evolution of mathematics. The extension of a conception of 
the infinitely rational nature to that of the infinitely rational sciences requires a 
communication or a conduit uniting nature and science. It is the modem development of 
mathematics which , according to Husserl, guarantees this unity. And it is only in the post- 
Renaissance period that the mathematical instruments available to scientific thinkers begin to 
“conquer and discover” (19) the infinite mathematical horizon, through the development of 
algebra, continuum mathematics and analytical geometry.
2.5. Galileo and the Mathematization of Nature
The passage from Antiquity to the Renaissance is thus one of recapitulation and modification. 
The central element retained by Renaissance thinkers is the notion of an idealized 
understanding of reality. Everything which exists does so in relation to an ideal form of 
existence. This ideal is then the measuring stick of the reality of the object in question. The 
geometry of Antiquity—primarily Euclidean geometry—is based on a methodology of 
application of the presupposed ideal on any given real existing object. In this sense the ideal 
precedes any experience of the world we might have. Moreover, the ideal is the precondition 
of our experience of the world.
In the Renaissance this ideal-as-precondition is conserved, but the nature of 
that ideal is transformed. One of the central figures of this renewal-with-a-difference, this 
Instauratio magna, was Francis Bacon who saw virtue in Ancient scientific models, but who 
sought a “rationalization” and systematization of their foundational principles. According to 
Bacon, scientific modernity shares the imperatives of research laid out Antiquity to seek truth 
and wisdom understood as universal values. But he saw a transformation in the universality of 




























































































development of methods of data collection.1’ The natural sciences have, according to Bacon, 
developed discontinuously through three periods, the Ancients, the Romans and the 
“Modems”, interrupted significantly by the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. The cause of 
this uneven development is the misunderstanding of the proper goal of the natural sciences, 
namely the “enrichment of human life through new inventions and means.” At the same time 
Bacon was an empiricist in the sense that the basis for “new inventions and means” had to 
spring out of our experience of the world. The rationality of the sciences arises from the 
rationality of the factual world. It is precisely this synthesis of platonic idealism—the assured 
ideality, or in modem terminology, rationality—assures the validity of empirical 
investigation. There is a necessary correspondance between our observations and the 
rationality of the universe.
In this sense we can say that Galileo was the first to operate with a distinctively 
modem conception of both nature and of the knowledge he sought to discover about nature. 
Both were understood as “rational”, but “rational” in a particularly innovative sense. Since 
Cicero the Latin ratio has been used to translate the Greek nous. But nous is understood in 
early Greek thought as far more theological, far more based on a comprehensive 
understanding of the role of given object in a larger cosmos or context. The modem sense of 
the word ratio has, in the spirit of the new empirical sciences, taken on the meaning of 
discrete unity. “Rational” is that which may be divided up into discrete unities, observed as 
singularity, and assimilated to a general categories that assembles that singularity into an 
understandable whole. Whereas the classical conception of rationality is based on the 
inscription of an observation in a global understanding of the universe, the Renaissance (and 
“modem”) notion of rationality corresponds to the inscription of an observation into a self- 
referential, closed dialectic of theory and observation. For Galileo this “mathematical” 
understanding of rationality is the decisive precondition for the understanding of reality. It is 
what Husserl calls the “self-evidence that motivates Galilean thought”, that is, “everything, 
which, in the evidence of absolute universal validity, geometry and above all the mathematics 
of pure spatio-temporal forms teaches us with respect to the pure forms which may ideally be 
constructed” (21).
2.6. Husserl and the Crisis in the History of Modern Science





























































































We have described Husserl’s historical conception of the modem as a situation of 
homogeneous unity. The unity and continuity of reality and rationality—of the ubiquitous 
nature of rationality, and of the universal applicability of one and the same reason—form 
what he sees as the background to Galileo’s understanding of the world. The problem of the 
contradiction between the infinity of the universe and the finite numbers of humans, the 
endless number of tasks necessary to comprehend the world scientifically, and the limited 
resources of the human scientist, is solved in Galileo’s time by the principle of extrapolation 
and universal applicability.
It is precisely this doctrine of applicability that has today fallen in disrepute. For 
the ideality of mathematics has a Janus face. While it normalizes all domains of reality, brings 
them under one and that same transcendental rubric of rationality, it does so through a 
“mathematization” of the world that is at odds with the cultural dimension of reality. If nature 
and reality in general can be exhausted by mathematical means, there is no room for 
humanity, for culture, social and historical meaning. Moreover, the process is self- 
reproducing. Mathematical rationality being the only measure of reality, it is mathematical 
rationality that is applied as a means to self-understanding of the natural sciences, 
mathematics is “pure regard”, “application on itself’ (46). It becomes a mere technique, art, in 
the purely technical sense. If it manages to create meaning, it is only in the self-regulation of 
its own rules and parameters. The rules and parameters require analytic (mathematized) 
technique which in tum can only be understood in turns of the mathematical relations which 
they manufacture. The “mathesis universalis”, coined by Leibniz is self reproducing: The 
farther physics penetrates the natural world through its logic of mathematization, and the 
more mathematic-scientific formulations about that world it has available to it, the larger 
becomes the field of possible conclusions which can be drawn from those formulations. (47). 
All notions of content, of reference to those humans who are objects of or deploy the natural 
sciences are completely excluded. Human beings can be understood only to the extent that 
they are quantifiable.
In Antiquity, at the moment of the formation of the first scientific principles, 
rationality was understood as episteme, as a comprehensive form of understanding. 
Mathematics was for the Greeks a meaningful science, an activity which gathered both what 
we understand to be the numeric function of mathematics, and the “natural” and “cultural” 
elements of the same. Mathematical understanding of nature was inseparable from a cultural 




























































































These provided the foundation for the production of meaning with respect to the sciences. 
Indeed the culture of the pre-scientific human provides the basis for the scientific method 
which follows it. The natural sciences function like machines that simplify and reduce 
objects to numeric facts, tear any possible meaning or content away from the idealized form, 
and discard it as immeasurable. They fail to understand “facticity”: the human or hermeneutic 
dimension in the relation to any given fact.
What originally was a unified reality in the philosophy of Antiquity is thus now 
split, the scientific and humanistic sides are irreducibly parted. The modem age is marked by 
what Husserl calls the opposition between “physical objectivism” and “transcendental 
subjectivism” .
In a paragraph entitle 'The Life-world as Forgotten Foundation of Meaning in the 
Natural Sciences” Husserl describes the process by which the European sciences have ended 
in today’s situation of crisis. Already Galileo, claims Husserl, was responsible for the 
suppression of the cultural, societal dimension of science—the life-world—a suppression that 
became the heritage of the physical sciences, then later, as the physical sciences became the 
dominant form of inquiry, it became dominant for other branches of natural science as well. 
According to Husserl, Galileo marks his own modernity by wrongly attributing to the 
“mathematically substrated world of idealities” what actually belongs to our “everyday life- 
world” (48-9). This false attribution has immediate consequences for the physicists of the 
following centuries. At the same time, and to Galileo’s credit, Galileo himself had inherited 
the privileging of techne. According to Husserl, even Greek geometry was developed on the 
theoretical level before it became a tool for making field measurements. Its own “ideality”, 
not a more proper relationship to everyday life, is its foundation of meaning. This foundation 
is then the model for the great inventions of “idealization” which have been so dominant in 
the history of physics, mathematics, and the natural sciences in general, and which have so 
distended the relationship between the sciences and the world of culture, society, and history. 
Husserl is unusually critical of Galileo and the “fateful omission”, which made him and 
generations of geometers blind to the complicated sources of meaning which the 
homogenizing and simplifying function of mathematization is incapable of taking account of 
(50)a
28 A useful contrast to Husserl’s extremely critical attitude toward Galileo may be found in José Ortega 





























































































In other words, those who invest in the systematic methodology of idealities meet 
themselves in the doorway, as it were. Those who ground their investigations of reality on 
idealizations of reality, can never go beyond such idealizations in their own self­
understanding. They are structurally incapable of seeing that science is also an object of 
scientific thought, that the purpose of life also belongs to life. Regardless of religious 
predisposition, the foundation of the meaning of life is living, not some abstraction of life. 
Likewise, the meaning of science cannot be an abstraction of science. Through the process of 
geometrical and scientific mathematization we end up measuring our life-world according to 
criteria which are not concomitant with it. We measure the life-world in the “ideational 
clothing” of the “so-called objective sciences”(51). The result of this clothing is that we 
confuse the method itself for “true being”, and thus the true meaning of the method, its 
formulas and theories remain unintelligible to us (52).
The natural sciences, from Galileo to our times, have been a theoretical failure 
because they have failed to take the radical consequences of their own historical foundations. 
The natural sciences have indeed failed to penetrate the meaning of their own method, have 
not been able to arrive at self-evaluation and self-critique because they have “forgotten” that 
the foundation of quantifiable method is itself unquantifiable.” The natural sciences have 
fallen into a hermetic trap, they have forgotten their extra-scientific origins. The natural 
sciences are structurally incapable of asking themselves, what is natural science? The true 
meaning of scientific processes in general and the natural sciences in particular is to found in 
the origin of the natural sciences, which itself is beyond science. The ultimate foundation of 
the natural sciences, as of any experience of reality is what Husserl calls the life-world. The 
life-world is the horizon of possible experience, the background that universally makes all 
experiences in particular understandable as experiences. The world is thus not at all the 
“world” as understood by the natural sciences, that is, a certain number of exhaustible objects 
of research. It is far more the ensemble of all things of which we are or can be conscious of.
What is the difference between the world of the sciences and the world of the life- 
world? We could begin by comparing the notions of “Truth”. “Truth” for natural sciences is a 
perfect correspondence or adequation between a given thought or criteria and the data that is 
available.” It is thus a one-to-one relationship, and in that sense the essence of quantification. 
Both the question or criteria and the object are supposedly exhausted, fully understood by
n  Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality. Beyond the New Physics. New York. Doubleday. 1985.




























































































virtue of merely being placed into a relation with each other. Thus, for example, “Is Venus a 
planet which rotates in a clockwise direction?” is a question which can in principle be 
exhausted by bringing to bear the right empirical data. The problem for Husserl and his 
conception of history, society and culture is that this ‘Truth” implies no “lived experience”. It 
is fundamentally a-human, even though it is supposedly deployed by a human scientist. It is 
not embedded in any form of social or cultural horizon. Moreover, if such an adequation 
were possible, it would be outside of our thinking it. Self-sufficient, it would not be thinkable 
from the outside because philosophy, or whatever instrument that defined the adequation 
couldn’t have any part in it. The perfect experience, one which would be spontaneously and 
completely meaningful, is not possible.”
On the other hand, the scientific experience is real, it is not just a set of principles 
or theories which deploy themselves as pure knowledge. There is a necessary rapport with the 
actual things of the world. In other words, the truth about the world is lived truth, the result of 
the application on the world of our awareness or consciousness. From this point of view, in 
order to answer the question, “Is Venus a planet which rotates in a clockwise direction?” we 
are required to actually observe Venus as real individuals, with different presuppositions and 
backgrounds. Clearly the only meaningful arrangement is some synthesis of the two, some 
common ground between the empirical reality and the subjective experience of it, or to use 
Husserl’s expressions, between physical objectivism and transcendental subjectivism. Husserl 
faults the European sciences for neglecting this unity, for overseeing the unity of the life- 
world as the basis of the European self-understanding.”
Conclusion: Culture as Crisis
The period between the last decades of the 19th century and the death of Edmund Husserl in 
1936 consists not only of a remarkable concentration of cultural and scientific creation, but 
also of an uncanny instability in the space between culture and science. The advent of 
quantum theory in the last years of the century brings with it a radical change in the self­
understanding of humanity. At the same time, the crisis at the origin of the modem human 
sciences puts into question the entire enterprise of the natural sciences. Husserl’s Crisis book 
rigorously exemplifies this paradox by making an impassioned plea for the re-foundation of
51 As Habermas has expressed it, “The meaning of knowledge itself becomes irrational in the name of 
knowledge”. Erkenntnis und Interesse. Frankfurt am Main. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988, p. 90.





























































































the natural sciences through their re-humanization. The unacceptable delinquency of the 
modem sciences lies in their neglect of the true nature of scientific objectivity. They have 
namely “forgotten” that the originary foundation of objective science lies in the life-world, 
understood as the synthesis of both the objective-physicalistic and the subjective- 
transcendental.
Thomas Mann’s own self-revision is in this light particularly revealing. As 
mentioned earlier, a family squabble between Mann and his brother Heinrich was played out 
in the public sphere as a debate between Enlightenment democratic ideals, on the one hand, 
and traditionally based systems of value and authority, on the other, between the French 19th 
century novel and theater and German late Romanticism. Throughout his 1915 polemical 
work, Observations of an Unpolitical Man, Mann berates his unnamed brother as a 
Zivilizationsliterat, a double insult evoking both the mechanical pretense to civilization 
through the mere virtues of rationality, overlooking, ignoring, or otherwise disdaining the 
civilizational presuppositions monopolized by the merits of the spirit, and a slap at the entire 
19th century French literary intelligentsia and what he saw as the artificial rationality of social 
realism. And yet beginning in 1920, Mann spends a significant amount of effort publicizing 
his “democratic confession"”, his greatest embarrassment thereafter being the ungainly 1915 
polemical piece.
In vicinity of Husserl’s Crisis book, the arguments of the Observations of an 
Unpolitical Man, like those of the Weimar anti-Republican intelligentsia in general, are 
strangely near. For the technologizing and mathematizing dimensions of modem physics 
since Galileo are criticized by Husserl in a manner very much parallel to Enlightenment 
strains of democracy. Thus in the Forward” to the Observations Mann attacks the lack of 
European spirit in the social conceptions of the new democratic movements. “The self and the 
world are the objects of our thought and poetry, not the roll, which a self sees itself playing in 
society, and not the mathematical-rationalized social world that forms or formed the object of 
the French novel and theater”.” The problem with democracy is that it aspires to a kind of 
human objectivity which empties human history and human endeavor of its meaningful 
content. Indeed it evacuates any room for humanity. The democratic insistence on the 
absolute identity, sovereignty and rationality of the individual, does nothing more than create
33 Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. Most of the essays and speeches colleceted 
together in the most recent edition of Observations express this sentiment in one form or another. Cf. for 
example, “Kulturund Politik", pp. 853-861.
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